... an 'object', by definition. Are there any objects, anything, which are given, truly known to us? A very relevant piece by Ayer, who writes as boldly as soberly: "There are no objects whose existence is indubitable... no synthetic propositions are logically sacrosanct... All of them, including the propositions which describe the content of our sensations, are hypotheses which, however great their probability, we may eventually find it expedient to abandon. All 'objects' are 'given' to us by sense-content." (121) Consciousness may be regarded as sense-experience from sense-content, sense-data, sensation. It may be asked, "What is a sensation and is it separate from my self? Are sensations of something other than mind?" Substantial queries also include, "What exactly is mind, self, and matter?" Knowing philosophers perpetually question, by definition, I discovered this to be the tour de force of this endeavor: Philonous: "Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an ...

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